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I.

THE CHANGING OBJECTIVE OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW

A traditional and frequently stated purpose of the antidiscrimination laws is to increase the chances that a given job will be offered to
the most qualified applicant for that position, without regard to the
applicant's race, gender, age, or physical handicaps. 1 In other words,
setting an ideal result of careers-open-to-talents, a goal of the act is
to minimize the number of mistakes that are made (by the antimeritocratic use of the stated criteria).
This theory sees the law as performing a fine-tuning function, i.e.,
keeping hiring practices attuned to their proper function (of finding
the most productive widget maker) and not deviating excessively in
any direction because of improper personal considerations. The image of the paradigmatic wrongdoer, against whom the laws provide a
remedy, is the firm which has hiring practices burdened with antimeritocratic prejudices, such as managers choosing "good old
boys" in opposition to those who would, in fact, be best for the job at
hand.
A happy implication of this theory is that antidiscrimination laws
might be essentially costless, at least with respect to values that are
clearly legitimate in their own right. If the most productive employees were selected more frequently, wages could be higher and consumer prices lower than they would otherwise be. The only loss
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would be in failing to satisfy the "taste to discriminate" of managers, fellow employees, or customers, which may not be a legitimate
taste to begin with, and may also be a taste that the antidiscrimination laws can help to change.
Epstein's book effectively demonstrates that the antidiscrimination
laws have, in practice, deviated radically from this "fine-tuning" objective.2 Prohibitions on disparate treatment of individuals on account of race have changed into de facto prohibitions on otherwise
useful practices with disparate impact on minority individuals. And
as the law has moved beyond the core case of race to encompass
gender, age, and handicapped status, employers are increasingly
urged to ignore (and thus either swallow or shift to others the effect
of) genuine differences in the productivity of individuals. 3
In short, contemporary law cannot realistically be seen as designed
to adjust hiring practices so as to reduce the number of mistakes,
defined as careers not effectively open to talents. The law has moved,
more like a sledgehammer than a fine-tuning device, toward altering
the distribution of mistakes, making sure that antimeritocratic decisions, although more frequent in number, are disproportionately visited on individuals within certain groups, i.e., whites, males, younger
workers, and those without physical handicaps. From the earlier perspective of making hiring decisions more meritocratically accurate,
the civil rights laws have been rather thoroughly corrupted.
As Epstein's book catalogues in some detail, the resulting regime
can in no way be characterized as costless in terms of legitimate
values. Real costs, both material and psychological, are incurred
when jobs and employees throughout the economy are systematically
mismatched. 4 The administrative costs of policing the motives for so
many hiring, promotion, and firing decisions are enormous.5 Employers are given an incentive to avoid hiring minorities and women with
uncertain track records out of fear that they could become legal
problems at the promotion and retention stages, and are also given
an incentive to locate in regions and nations where racial minorities
are less numerous.6 Wages become lower, and consumer prices
higher, as firms are compelled to change their production structure
to accommodate handicapped employees and to retain older workers
who are less productive (but not in sufficiently palpable ways to
guarantee inexpensive and certain victory in court).7
2. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
3. Id. at 206-41, 441-94.
4. Id. at 283-312 (arguing that Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) has
been interpreted to exclude legitimate standards matching employees and jobs).
5. Id. at 259.
6. Id. at 262-63.
7. Id. at 441-94.
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Epstein's book forces us to ask two questions about this phenomenon of a change in focus of the antidiscrimination laws. First, was it
inevitable that the antidiscrimination laws would follow this course,
i.e., is it hopeless to envision a return to a fine-tuning regime because
a political slippery slope guarantees a reversion to a regime similar
to the one we currently have? Second, if it was inevitable, should we
live with the resulting costs, or bite the bullet and repeal antidiscrimination laws in the private economy? Although this Article cannot answer these two, very large, questions, it discusses
considerations pertinent to such answers in the next two sections.
II.

Is A RETURN TO A FINE-TUNING REGIME POSSIBLE?

An initial problem with a fine-tuning regime concerns the questionable need for such a system, given the existence of market incentives to resist racism and related prejudices. If racism is understood,
in part, as holding false beliefs about the productivity of minority
individuals, it is easy enough to see that market incentives are an
excellent device for combatting racism. Employers who can learn to
set aside their racism will make more money by having a more productive work force, and those employers who are constitutionally incapable of setting aside their prejudices will lose out competitively to
those who are capable of doing so. 8
Of course, as Epstein notes, competitive markets are not always
permitted to operate. If firms fear that nondiscriminatory practices
on their part will bring on unopposed private or union violence and
state discrimination, they may be unwilling to be the first to integrate. Epstein suggests that this was a major problem with the
Southern governments in place in 1964.1 It is not clear whether the
same problem would exist at the present time, given the changes
brought about in Southern politics by the effective extension of voting rights to blacks, but further empirical study of this issue would
appear to be warranted.
Even with competitive markets, the incentives to eliminate racism
are not complete. Markets efficiently allocate resources to accommodate tastes, and racism by employees, managers, and consumers can
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be characterized as tastes. Moreover, race might be used as an inexpensive proxy for other nonracial traits. 10 The important point, however, is to stress the inherent limits on the size of these problems.
The "taste for racism" is disciplined by the fact that markets force
people to pay for the tastes they hold from their own pockets. Consumers might break ties by buying American over Japanese television sets or cars, but very few will pay an unlimited penalty to
vindicate their nationalist tastes."1 Proxy racism also has inherent
size limits because, if large numbers of qualified minorities are being
overlooked, it will become increasingly expensive for employers to
use race as a proxy for quality.
The most accurate statement would seem to be that competitive
forces are an excellent device for avoiding large deviations from the
principle of careers-open-to-talents. A governmental fine-tuning regime would have to be content with making rather small changes to
a preexisting background that already had made most of the major
changes for reasons of self-interest, at least in sectors where competitive industry was permitted to operate.
Is there reason to believe that collective action could successfully
fine tune a system that was already calibrated to avoid large mistakes, or that such a collective regime would be willing to confine
itself to such a modest task? Indeed, more broadly, is there some
reason to believe that our society collectively would act so as to minimize a racism to which we as individuals were susceptible? In 1964,
one might have viewed the question in essentially sectional terms: a
majority of the nation was regulating the private actions of a regional minority. With the extension of voting rights and the general
homogenization of the nation over the last thirty years, the idea of
10. Epstein notes that if some firms use race as a proxy for quality, the utility of
that proxy will gradually decline as the higher quality nonminority employees are systematically removed from the pool. See id. at 31-41. The result is that a new firm beginning today would very likely not benefit from using race as a proxy, its utility for that
end having already been exhausted by other firms. Epstein's point seems important, but
it does concede the earlier use by firms of race as a proxy.
11. Epstein argues that product markets and employment markets may be different in this respect, given the relatively "spot market" character of the former and the
relatively long-term, "relational" character of the latter. See id. at 60-72. A racist might
consider it more difficult to live with a member of the disfavored race on an ongoing
basis, while she would be willing to buy her products. Indeed, such behavior need not
always be racist in any obvious sense; there may simply be a cultural incompatibility
between groups as they have evolved historically (one group preferring loud music and
another quietude).
The formal point is still correct: the racist must pay for her racist tastes, and similarly
a person who must have loud music that others find intolerable will have to pay for that
taste. Markets not only reduce racism by putting a price on it; they also reduce cultural
pluralism in any area where cultures have evolved in ways that directly clash. Where the
clash of cultures is not externally patent, however, markets will put a price on (and thus
discourage) gratuitous intolerance of what becomes seen as the "private" behavior of
other races.
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the Civil Rights Act as merely a cold war continuation of the Civil
War seems less compelling. This fact squarely raises the question of
exactly who is trying to regulate whom with national antidiscrimination laws, and why the regulating "who" is regarded as holding more
accurate racial views than the regulated "whom."
Since racism largely involves false factual beliefs held by individuals because those beliefs are pleasing to racial vanity, the question
essentially is whether collectivities will be better informed about the
true productivity of minority and nonminority employees than will
private employers. Unfortunately, collective action has always been
conducive to false factual beliefs. When actions are taken collectively, the incentive of each individual to inform herself of the true
state of affairs is extremely attenuated.12 The chances that the collective action will be different if any one individual becomes well
informed are slight, and most of the benefits of a wise decision (or
costs of an unwise one) are externalized to persons other than the
one deciding whether to become well informed.
This public choice problem explains the rational ignorance of collective actors but not their systematic tendency to embrace racist
falsehoods as against others. Interethnic tensions, coupled with false
beliefs and crude stereotypes, are exceptionally common phenomena
all over the globe and down through history. This commonality in
the face of otherwise radically diverse cultural circumstances suggests that there is something about human nature that perversely
predisposes people to embrace racist falsehoods.
As I have written elsewhere, what people have in common is their
biological nature, and sociobiology does indeed have a theory of racism.' 3 The selfish gene encourages us to be differentially sympathetic toward those genetically similar to ourselves.' 4 This is not to
say that racist beliefs will necessarily be extremely strong or that
they cannot be combatted by socialization. Certainly, relative to the
differential sympathy one is likely to show toward one's own children
or siblings, the genetic linkage among ethnic group members is
highly attenuated.' 5 However, when it can be indulged on the cheap
12. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, BELL J. ECON. &
Sci. 3 (1971); Christopher T. Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, 91 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91 (1983).
13. See Christopher T. Wonnell, Circumventing Racism: Confronting the Problem
of the Affirmative Action Ideology, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 95, 103-11.
14. See PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, THE ETHNIC PHENOMENON 15 (1981);
DANIEL G. FREEDMAN, HUMAN SOCIOBIOLOGY: A HOLISTIC APPROACH 137-38 (1979).
15. This point is stressed in Irwin Silverman, Race, Race Differences, and Race
MGMT.

and when counterpressures are absent, people will be inclined to
lapse into their natural intraethnic sympathies. And there is nothing
cheaper than choosing to embrace pleasing factual beliefs of one's
racial superiority when deciding how to make collective decisions;
one bears almost no personal cost from entertaining such false beliefs. This is a chilling point of intersection between public choice
theory and sociobiology.
A metaphor drawn from the natural sciences may be helpful here.
The tendency of collective action to turn racist seems to bear some
similarity to the physical force of gravity. Relative to the other
forces, gravity is exceptionally weak; it produces major effects such
as holding the planets in their orbits only because very large numbers of atoms are all "pulling" space-time in the same direction.'6
Similarly, each individual citizen may have only a small tendency
toward racism, generated by the subconscious mind's crude analogy
to the ingroup loyalty that helped our ancestors survive through
primitive times. With collective action, however, racism will very
likely be one of the few common denominators in which the predispositions of most people will be pulling in the same direction, creating a highly salient and identifiable majority passion.
Given this dynamic, it seems inevitable that collective action will
be highly susceptible to the forces of racial politics and race-based
rationalizations. At times, majority racism may be outweighed by
minority racism, especially if the majority is divided along other
dimensions or touched by guilt or feelings of sympathy. At other
times, the majority race will reassert its own racial myths and
prejudices. A politicized society with a large state sector making innumerable calls about the racial character of economic decisions is
destined to be a society plagued by racial factions and intrigue. The
balance of forces at any given time may affect which group's racial
mythology serves as the temporary basis for policy. However, the
idea that a roughly truthful picture of the factual potential of each
individual could ever arise from such a poisonous atmosphere seems
most implausible.
In short, a market economy, which removes many decisions from
collective action dynamics, looks much better in the area of race relations when one considers the alternatives. Markets discipline racial
mythology, forcing actors to avoid large mistakes based upon either
bigoted views of racial inadequacy or "politically correct" wishful
thinking that ethnicity and productivity are wholly uncorrelated. The
political process makes it likely that racial myths will be taken for
Relations: Perspectivesfrom Psychology and Sociobiology, in SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS. ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 205, 216-17 (1987).
16. See ROBERT MORRIS, THE NATURE OF REALITY 74 (1987).
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facts, and unlike markets, there is little pressure disciplining the size
of the mistakes that can be made on the basis of such mythologies.
Fine-tuning is not generally government's strong suit. The state
can prosecute a war or ban fluorocarbons more effectively than it can
make the nuanced, marginal judgments required in economic planning or employment markets. Collectivist fine-tuning in the racial
area, with racisms of every variety competing for dominance in an
atmosphere of rational ignorance on all sides, is actually a quite implausible notion. If not inevitable, it is surely unsurprising that the
civil rights laws have moved away from any semblance of marginal
fine-tuning and have themselves become a major instrument of racial
politics.
III.

SHOULD ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS FOR COMPETITIVE

MARKETS

BE

REPEALED?

With characteristic courage, Epstein argues for the unthinkable:
repealing all antidiscrimination laws governing competitive employment, including discrimination based upon race, gender, age, and
handicaps." His case for the efficiency of this move is very strong,
but few people would be moved to repeal civil rights laws because of
considerations of economic efficiency. Whether because of the diminishing marginal utility of income, Rawlsian concerns for the resources of the least advantaged, or a conservative desire to include
everyone in the system to avoid civil unrest, most people are willing
to tolerate a lot of inefficiency if it brings racial minorities and other
severely disadvantaged persons into the mainstream economy.
Unfortunately, there is considerable reason to believe that the long
run effect of the civil rights laws will be to alienate the minority
community from the mainstream society rather than to include it.
The story told here - that civil rights laws may create large inefficiencies by mismatching employees and jobs, but that this mismatching is tolerable because it helps to promote social justice - is
one that only an outsider to the system can believe for very long.
Beneficiaries of the programs cannot be expected to believe that the
meritocratic standards to which they have been partially exempted,
but which they will periodically have brutally reimposed when the
situation demands, are valid and important standards for maintaining a good society. 18
17.
18.
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A deep alienation from the core values and standards of the society, albeit disguised by the surface conservatism of any group nominally included in powerful institutions, is the predictable byproduct
of a system whereby different races succeed in accord with different
ideologies. It also makes it difficult to see how the minority underclass can become integrated into the mainstream society when minority opinion leaders to whom they might naturally look for
guidance have themselves become so alienated from conventional
standards and values.
One cannot be sanguine, therefore, about the long-run potential of
civil rights laws to serve a conservatizing function. To be sure, the
transition shock of repealing antidiscrimination laws would be enormous, a matter to which Epstein pays insufficient attention. Apart
from the inevitable symbolic misinterpretation that repeal represents
"open season" for discrimination, there would be quite tangible effects of repealing the laws. Persons who were hired, promoted, or
retained to fill formal goals will often find themselves laid off or otherwise disadvantaged, especially as existing firms are forced to compete with new firms that have never built workforces with an eye
toward satisfying bureaucratic requirements. The civil rights laws
are responsible for an atrocious situation in which the only apparent
alternatives are to allow the progressive alienation of minority opinion leaders from mainstream standards or to impose severe transition
shocks upon minority individuals.
If the laws were to be repealed, something else would have to be
done to include the disadvantaged in the mainstream society. Ideally,
those initiatives should do as little damage to market principles as
possible, both because that would help the programs work and because it would minimize the creation of yet more ideologies. For
these reasons, educational vouchers and apprenticeship contracts
might be worth trying as methods of enhancing the productivity of
prospective minority employees. 9 For the handicapped (and perhaps
for the aged as well), Professor Cooter's proposal for a tax and subsidy or hiring credit regime appears promising. 0 It should not generate the same backlash that comparable programs would produce in
the racial area, because the idea that the handicapped (and aged)
are somewhat less productive and deserving of modest subsidies
seems capable of being internalized by actual system participants.
Child care vouchers would assist with the full integration of women
The benefits to minority children of educational vouchers are noted in THOMAS
70-89, 300 (1993). I have discussed apprenticeship contracts in Christopher T. Wonnell, The ContractualDisempowerment of Employees, 46 STAN. L. REV. 87, 116-20 (1993).
20. See Robert D. Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133
(1994).
19.
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into the workforce. An exploration of these and other alternatives
would obviously become a high priority if the antidiscrimination laws
were to be repealed or significantly weakened.

